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COMMENT
THE DISCLOSURE OF POLITICALLY SENSITIVE
SPECIES' LOCATION INFORMATION UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ON WHETHER
AUDUBON SOCIETY'S' "PUZZLING SITUATION"2
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
Most conscientious biologists agree that we are entering a
new wave of mass extinction.3 While there have been mass
extinctions throughout Earth's history, the conduct of humans
has never before been the catalyst.4 In 1973, Congress formal-
ly recognized the human role in this tragedy and articulated
"the most clear-cut and absolute federal policy mandate for the
protection of nature"5 when it enacted the Endangered Species
Act (the "ESA").6 Since that time, the ESA has unfortunately
been credited with creating a tremendous conflict between the
government's policy of protecting endangered species and the
1 Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter MAS 11]; see also Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest
Serv., 108 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter MAS /] (considering
"identical arguments in a case involving the same questions and the same
parties"). The case appealed to the Tenth Circuit is referred to as "MAS II,"
following the approach taken by the Audubon Society's counsel in the Ninth
Circuit litigation, see Brief of Appellants at tbl. of contents, Audubon Soc'y v.
United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-16919) (on file
with Brooklyn Law Review) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants]. The Ninth Circuit
case was filed prior to, but decided after, the Tenth Circuit appeal. See id.
2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 5.3, at 126 (3d ed. Supp. 1999).
' See David Quammen, Planet of Weeds: Tallying the Losses of Earth's Ani-
mals and Plants, HARPER'S, Oct. 1998, at 57, 58-59.
See id. at 61.
RICHARD N.L. ANDRE WS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OUR-
SELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 293 (1999).
' The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 and Supp. 1998).
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interests of property owners Recent federal courts of appeals
decisions and proposed legislation have brought to this conflict
the question of how access to information about endangered
species might be regulated to advance the federal government's
wildlife policy.
The United States Forest Service (the "FS") recently lost
two significant cases concerning the release of sensitive data
about the location of endangered species.' In each, the
Maricopa Audubon Society (the "MAS") gained access to infor-
mation through the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA) 9
which, according to the FS, could also be used by adversaries
of wildlife protection, thereby increasing the risk of harm to
endangered species that the FS is charged with protecting."
Shortly after these decisions were handed down, the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works reported out a
bill, which, among other significant amendments, proposed a
change to current law to avoid the situation raised by these
decisions."
The bill's introduction provides a textbook example of how
the separation of powers works, in that the debate about ac-
cess to information that might help undermine the effective-
ness of a federal statute was transferred from the chambers of
the judiciary to the policy-balancing arena of the legislature.
This bill stalled, however, and no specific legislative action has
been taken to address the FS's concerns about these cases,
although other bills have considered similar language.12 This
Comment reviews these recent decisions, engages in the debate
about whether they should be addressed by legislation, and
concludes with a qualified endorsement. While this precedent
is ripe for congressional action, any new law providing an
additional basis to withhold information about the location of
7 See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 294.
8 MAS II, 104 F.3d 1201; MAS 1, 108 F.3d 1082.
9 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
10 See MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1203; see also MAS I, 108 F.3d at 1086.
n The Senate and the House introduced similar bills, S. 1180, 105th Cong.
(1997) and H.R. 2351, 105th Cong. (1997), both named the "Endangered Species
Recovery Act of 1997." The amended version of Senate Bill 1180 was reported out
of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and contains the
proposed exemption analyzed in this Comment. See S. REP. No. 105-128 (1997),
available at 1997 WL 688536.
'2 See infra Part III.
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endangered species must be narrowly crafted to accomplish a
careful balancing between the interests of environmental
groups, who provide independent oversight of federal agency
actions (and the effects of those actions on protected species),
and the interests of landowners, which are certainly not al-
ways aligned with the federal policy articulated in the ESA.
FOIA13 generally requires federal agencies to open their
files to public inspection to advance the interests of democracy
and good government, regardless of the identity of the FOIA
requester.' Recognizing that the federal government must
sometimes operate behind closed doors to be effective, Con-
gress provided limited exceptions to this broad disclosure man-
date. 5 One such exemption, Exemption 2,16 permits the
withholding of information "related solely to the internal per-
sonnel rules and practices of an agency."7
One accepted variant 8 of Exemption 2 permits the
withholding of agency materials if (1) the requested documents
satisfy the language of Exemption 2 and (2) the agency sus-
tains its burden of showing that release of the documents
would increase the risk that agency regulations might be cir-
cumvented. 9 Most cases upholding the assertion of this so-
called "high 2"20 variant of Exemption 2 do so where the docu-
ments are clearly related to internal rules and practices.2'
One scenario not contemplated by the current two-part test is
13 5 U.S.C. § 552.
" See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE AND PRIVACY ACT OvERVIEW 3
(1998) [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE] (citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 242 (1978)); see also United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, The Free-
dom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legis-
lating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 655 (1984).
, See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3.
16 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
17 Id.
" The variant discussed in this Comment has been adopted by four circuits.
See MAS II, 104 F.3d 1201, 1204, 1204 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Kaganove v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hardy v. Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980); Caplan v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978)).
9 See, e.g., Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 889-90 (withholding an employee candidate
rating plan to avoid thwarting agency objectives).
22 Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
21 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 108-10.
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that in which the documents do not clearly fall within the
language of Exemption 2, but where their release might never-
theless lead to circumvention of agency regulations. It is this
limitation in particular that transfers the dispute from the
courtroom to Congress.
The Tenth and Ninth Circuits recently confronted this
scenario in two nearly identical cases brought by the MAS
against the FS: Audubon Society v. United States Forest Ser-
vice2 and Maricopa Audubon Society v. United States Forest
Service' (respectively, MAS I' and "MAS F'). Over the
strong objections of the FS, both courts of appeals approved the
disclosure of documents because they did not clearly fall within
the language of Exemption 2, even though, as the FS was
prepared to argue, the release of information might lead to
circumvention of agency regulations.24
As argued below, under Exemption 2, the MAS cases were
probably decided correctly.' Yet the result of these decisions
is that information that reveals the precise location of endan-
gered species is available to anyone who submits a request for
it under FOIA, including those intent on harming species.26
To date, the risk that an individual could request information
pursuant to FOIA to circumvent the FS's enforcement efforts
remains unresolved, largely because the 105th Congress failed
to enact a version of a Senate bill containing language specifi-
cally intended to close the loophole revealed by these cases.
This Comment contends that because the FS's basis for assert-
ing Exemption 2 was weak under most constructions of that
exemption, one remedy available to the FS is to seek specific
exemption language in Congress.
22 104 F.3d 1201.
108 F.3d 1082.
24 See MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1204-05; MAS 1, 108 F.3d at 1086-87.
"See infra Part II.C.
21 See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra, note 2, § 5.3, at 126.
27 Despite intense efforts by supporters to attach the bill as a rider to a last-
minute appropriations bill, it was never enacted. See Tom Daschle, The 105th Con-
gress: Much Promise; Little Progress, CONG. PRESS RELEASE, Oct. 7, 1998, at 10.
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Part I of this Comment presents an introduction to the
underlying statute, the ESA,2" an examination of the basis for
the FS's concern that disclosure of the documents at issue
would increase the risk of circumvention of the ESA, and a
discussion of the relevant provisions of FOIA. Part II reviews
the Tenth and Ninth Circuit decisions that give rise to this
analysis, concluding that while these decisions were correctly
decided, the analytical framework of Exemption 2 is ill-suited
to resolve future disputes in which a FOIA requester could
successfully obtain information to harm protected species.
Drawing on background provided in Part I, Part III analyzes
the implications of the recent congressional response to the
MAS decisions. This Part contends that the proposed exemp-
tion could be used to close the loophole illustrated by the MAS
litigation, and it concludes that if Congress should choose to
create an exemption that permits the withholding of data re-
lating to the location of species, it should do so only in a man-
ner that promotes federal wildlife protection without disturb-
ing the oversight functions of environmental groups.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The Endangered Species Act of 197329
1. Development and General Provisions
Sometime after (and possibly in reaction to) the publica-
tion in 1962 of Rachel Carson's SILENT SPRING, Congress recog-
nized that "consideration of [the] need to protect the endan-
gered species went beyond the value of the aesthetic."0 In the
ESA, Congress codified what would prove to be a powerfully
divisive policy: the federal government would no longer be
indifferent to the destruction of our country's "natural boun-
ty.,3
1
28 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
29 Id.
3' JACK W. GROSSE, THE PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF OuR NATURAL
RESOURCES, WILDLIFE, AND HABITAT 91 (1997).
M Congressman John D. Dingell, The Endangered Species Act: Legislative Per-
spectives on a Living Law, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION: THE EN-
DANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 25, 26 (Kathryn A. Kohm
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Declaring that some species "have been rendered extinct
as a consequence of economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation," Congress
determined, among other things, that "all Federal departments
and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and
threatened species and shall utilize their authorities" to protect
the ecosystems on which the species depend. The ESA is an
expansive legislative scheme intended "to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."33
The ESA first requires the Secretary of the Interior or the
Secretary of Commerce 4 to determine which species are en-
dangered or threatened 5 by using various broadly-phrased
factors." The Secretary is not alone, however, in initiating
the listing process. Interested persons may petition to add or
remove a species from the endangered or threatened species
list.3 The Secretary then examines the sufficiency of scientific
and commercial information to determine whether further
action is warranted for such "candidate" species.38 On the
Secretary's determination that further consideration is re-
quired, the species is then "proposed" for listing by promptly
publishing notice thereof in the Federal Register.39 In certain
"emergency" situations, the Secretary may by-pass detailed
notice and comment requirements to temporarily, but immedi-
ately, list a species.4" A list of those species determined to be
ed., 1991) [hereinafter BALANCING].
32 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1), (b), (c)(1).
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1973).
14 "Secretary" is defined in the ESA to denote either the Secretary of the Inte-
rior or the Secretary of Commerce, and in some situations, the Secretary of Agri-
culture. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).
An "endangered" species is one "in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range" except for certain insects. A "threatened" species is
one "likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future through-
out all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(6), (20).
36 These factors include the following: habitat destruction, overutilization of the
species, disease or predation, inadequacy of current regulation, and other factors
natural and manmade. See id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).
See id. § 1533(a)(3).
" See id. § 1533(b); see also Laurence Michael Bogert, That's My Story and I'm
Stickin' To It: Is the "Best Available" Science Any Available Science Under the
Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 93 (1994) (citing 50 C.F.R.
§ 424.20(b)).
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
" See id. § 1533(b)(7).
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endangered or threatened under either the notice and com-
ment procedures or on an emergency basis must be published
in the Federal Register.4
Once a species is listed as endangered or threatened, the
Secretary is then required to designate its "critical habitat" to
the "maximum extent prudent and determinable."42 Critical
habitat designation need not be made where the identification
(and subsequent publication in the Federal Register) of a
species' location might bring greater harm to the species.4"
While the Secretary may consider the economic impact in mak-
ing a critical habitat designation,44 listing decisions are to be
based on the best scientific and commercial data available.45
The Secretary is also responsible for developing "recovery
plans" for listed species, unless doing so would not promote
conservation.4" Such "recovery plans" are to include site-spe-
cific actions necessary for recovery, criteria for evaluating re-
covery, and estimates of how long the plan will be in effect.47
The ESA also requires all federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary and to insure that any agency actions are "not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species" or adversely modify their critical
habitat.48
The ESA expressly prohibits a wide range of conduct relat-
ing to listed species, including the import or export, the "tak-
ing,"4 the possession, the transportation, and the sale of list-
ed species of fish or wildlife." Some recent court decisions
41 See id. § 1533(c).
'2 See id. § 1533(a)(3).
The designation of critical habitat can lead both vandals and rare wildlife
collectors to the species the ESA intends to protect. See Thomas F. Darin, Desig-
nating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Ver-
sus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 209, 217 (2000); Jack McDonald,
Chapter, Critical Habitat Designation Under the Endangered Species Act: A Road
to Recovery?, 28 ENVTL L. 671, 683 (1998).
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
41 See id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
" See id. § 1533(f).
'7 See id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
4 See id. § 1536(a).
" '[T]ake' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19).
"' See id. § 1538(a)-(g).
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have condoned an expanded interpretation of the term "tak-
ing," which now includes habitat degradation that kills or
injures species.5 The ESA imposes both civil and criminal
penalties for violations.52
Some provisions of the ESA belie its intent to save species
at all costs. There are several limited exemptions that exclude
from coverage acts that allow for establishment of experimen-
tal populations, acts that may result in only "incidental" tak-
ings, acts resulting from contracts entered into before the ESA
was enacted, hunting by Alaskan natives for subsistence pur-
poses, etc.5" Furthermore, in response to the unexpected Su-
preme Court ruling in TVA v. Hill,54 the ESA was amended to
permit submission of applications to the Endangered Species
Committee, which is empowered to override the effect of the
act with respect to agency actions.55
" See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 704-08 (1995) (upholding Secretary's determination that "take" includes
"significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wild-
life."); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that habitat destruction by competing species constituted a
"taking" of endangered bird).
52 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540; see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 746
(1986) (upholding conviction, based in part on the ESA, of a Yankton Sioux for
shooting several bald and golden eagles).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
437 U.S at 173 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)) (upholding an injunction
prohibiting the completion of the Tellico Dam because the ESA mandated that
federal agencies must "insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by
them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species); see also
Lynn A. Greenwalt, The Power and Potential of the Act, in BALANCING, supra note
31, at 32 ("The real strength of the act, however, did not become evident until the
tiny snail darter illuminated the issue."). In fact, it appears that the result in
TVA v. Hill was entirely unanticipated by legislators, who would later report that
they did not think they were voting to protect anything other than eagles, bears,
and whooping cranes and that they certainly did not believe the ESA would raise
any questions about large public works projects and similar developments. See
BALANCING, supra note 31, at 32.
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
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2. The Basis for the Forest Service's Concern About
Increased Risk of Circumvention
Because the ESA causes significant economic impact on
society,56 it should not be surprising that ESA regulation has
occasionally motivated people to retaliate against groups in-
volved in activities related to protecting endangered species."
Furthermore, while some landowners express concern that the
law does not promote responsible stewardship, others appear
to have taken more direct action in order to avoid ESA regula-
tion."8 These results, caused by the fear of regulation, have
led many to criticize the ESA because it creates "perverse
incentives that destroy habitat."59
" For example, "federal protection for the northern spotted owl under the ESA
has been estimated at a 'societal' cost of between $21 and $46 billion." See Bogert,
supra note 38, at 87.
"7 See, e.g., Mike Taugher, Group Claims Santa Fe Shooting, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Dec. 12, 1998, available at 1998 WL 16514365 (reporting that underground group
took credit for shooting out window at animal protection office on news of reintro-
duction of endangered Mexican grey wolves).
" One property owner recently editorialized, "If an endangered species is dis-
covered on my property, the government is empowered to effectively confiscate my
land to preserve the species' habitat." Joe Pryor, Editorial, Species-Protection Act
Needs to be Updated, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., June 14, 1998, at F3, available
at 1998 WL 2175745. Pryor lamented and explained, "The law gives me no incen-
tive to manage my land with sound environmental practices. Instead it's in my
financial interest to destroy the habitat and thereby accelerate the extinction of
species." Id. Fear of habitat regulation under the ESA has induced some landown-
ers to "take affirmative actions to ensure that no such habitat exists on their
property." Ike Sugg, Viewpoints, Safe Harbors Aren't Safe for Landowners, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 5, 1998, at 37A, available at 1998 WL 13100592.
" Sugg, supra note 58. Some have stated that on finding listed species, the
ESA produces the following result: "Even if you don't have any plans [to build],
you still might want to kill the creature lest it someday wipe out the value of
your property." Jesse Walker, Specious Reform, NAT'L REV., May 18, 1998, at 36,
available at 1998 WL 14557063. Stated similarly, "[C]urrent laws [including the
ESA] create perverse incentives that discourage people from creating, enhancing or
preserving wetlands or species habitat .... Tragically, there is mounting evidence
that fear of government regulation is driving landowners to destroy potential habi-
tat for endangered species to avoid attracting them." H. Sterling Burnett, Com-
mentary/OP-ED, Endangered Property, THE WASH. TINIES, June 19, 1996, available
at 1996 WL 2957986. "[Flarmers nonetheless live in such fear of enforcement [of a
state endangered species act] that many engage in 'scorched earth' farming, not
allowing any stray greenery to take hold on fallow ground or around the edges of
fields." Mary Lynne Vellinga, State Loosens Species Guards; Bill Overhauls Rules
on Killing Animals, THE DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Sept. 28, 1997, at N10, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting on passage of California bill which
allows developers and farmers to kill endangered species).
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These critics claim that the current scheme has produced
the unexpected result of "panic cutting" in which landowners
destroy habitat to avoid regulation, often leading to an acceler-
ated rate of extinction and environmental degradation (i.e.,
publication of a proposed listing in the Federal Register may
lead to acceleration of commercial development of the species'
habitat)." Environmental groups and habitats are not the
only ones threatened by landowners' fears of regulation. The
species themselves have been targeted in retaliation for efforts
to control land use.61
As articulated by the FS, there are several legitimate
bases for the fears of landowners. While the last basis was the
only one presented by the FS in the MAS litigation,62 an addi-
tional basis for these fears (often expressed in the context of
making critical habitat designations) is that there is an in-
creased risk of illegal takings at the hands of wildlife collec-
tors.63
B. The Freedom of Information Act and Exemption 2
1. Introduction
The disclosure mandate of FOIA is based on the belief that
an informed citizenry is vital to the functioning of democracy
and that government information is "needed to check against
" See Eric Pryne, Unintended Dilemma: Endangered Species Act Prompts Own-
ers to Clear-or Sell, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1995, at 5G, available at 1995 WL
6220320; see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Scott Sonner, Endangered Species Act Critics Claim Victory in
Yearslong Fight Over Rare Plant, THE COLUMBIAN, Nov. 28, 1998, available at
1998 WL 17203497 (reporting delisting of the Sodaville Milkvetch and noting that
"listing the plant could do more harm than good if someone decided to wipe it out
in retaliation" and that to do so would be quite easy considering the limited num-
ber of specimens remaining---A can of gasoline would take care of the whole spe-
cies."). Department of Justice Attorney John Schnitker stated at oral argument in
the MAS 1I litigation, "We'd have to disclose [the maps] to Joe Six-Pack who just
lost his job at the lumber mill." Scott Sandlin, Forest Service Fights Release of
Owl Maps: Move Could Hurt Species, Lawyer Says, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 20,
1996, at D3, available at LEXIS; see also Brief for Appellees at 33-34, Audubon
Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-16919)
(on file with Brooklyn Law Review) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
62 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 7 n.4, 33-35.
"There is little doubt a critical habitat map can be a virtual 'treasure map'
to a collector of a rare species . . . ." McDonald, supra note 43, at 683.
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corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the gov-
erned."' In order to achieve this goal, FOIA "generally pro-
vides that any person has a right, enforceable in court, of ac-
cess to federal agency records, except to the extent that such
records .. are protected from disclosure by one of nine exemp-
tions or by one of three special law enforcement exclusions.' s
Under FOTA, federal agencies are required to make certain
categories of information available to the public either by pub-
lishing information in the Federal Register,6 by making infor-
mation available for public inspection and copying in "reading
rooms,"67 or by making records available on request." Con-
gress substantially amended FOIA several times since its en-
actment in 196669 to deal with disclosure provisions of other
statutes, district court review of FOJA requests, special law
enforcement record exclusions, and electronic records.7 °
While the purpose of FOIA may be to ensure an informed
citizenry, the policy of broad disclosure articulated by FOIA7'
is not to be advanced so zealously as to ignore the conflict be-
tween disclosure and "other vital societal aims."72 Therefore, a
number of exemptions to FOJA allow agencies to withhold
information under specific circumstances, 3  although it is
" FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)).
FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3.
" See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
Id. § 552(a)(2).
6 See id. § 552(a)(3).
6' Most notably in 1974 in response to Watergate. See Wald, supra note 14, at
659 (reviewing FOIA success stories after the 1974 Amendments); see also FOIA
GUIDE, supra note 14, at 10.
70 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 9-13.
71 "The mandate of the FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records,"
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 & n.9 (1985) ("The Court has consistently recog-
nized this principle.").
72 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3. The right of access provided by FOIA
must be "balanced against other values .... [in a manner that is] often excruci-
atingly difficult . . . ." Wald, supra note 14, at 656.
"' For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant subsections of § 552(b) read
as follows:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the mat-
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
well-settled that any such exemption must be narrowly con-
strued74 in light of FOIA's purpose of providing for broad dis-
closure.7"
2. Exemption 2: "Related Solely to the Internal
Personnel Rules and Practices of an Agency"76
Exemption 2 permits the withholding of federal agency
records "related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency."77 Ambiguous on its face,7" this lan-
guage was initially the source of significant judicial consterna-
tion as courts struggled with conflicting sources of legislative
history.79 While the bill's Senate Report suggested that the
scope of Exemption 2 permits the withholding of mere house-
keeping matters," the House report stated that the exemp-
tion permits the withholding of "[olperating rules, guidelines,
and manuals."" The following section provides an introduc-
ters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre-
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)-(3).
7' See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978); Dep't
of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
" See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
76 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
77 Id.
'8 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.38[4], at
255 (2d ed. 1997) ("The scope of [Exemption 2] is not clear from the language of
the Act.").
71 "The interpretation of this exemption has been hotly contested." Dirksen v.
United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 803 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir.
1986). See generally Marnie Joy Carro, Note, Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobac-
co, and Firearms: A Result-Oriented Approach to FOIA Exemption 2, 32 CATH. U.
L. REV. 317, 318-34 (1983) (reviewing early cases and the legislative history of
Exemption 2).
80 " 'Exemption No. 2 relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking
facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and
the like.' " Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting S.
REP. No. 89-813, at 8 (1965)).
81 The Vaughn court quoted House Report 1497 when it stated:
2. Matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
any agency: Operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for
Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure,
but this exemption would not cover all "matters of internal management"
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tion to this heavily litigated area of law by reviewing the lead-
ing federal appellate decisions, particularly those of the D.C.
Circuits2 and, of course, the Supreme Court, 3 which resolved
these differences by harmonizing the two approaches. General-
ly speaking, house-keeping matters of little public interest may
be withheld under the "low 2" interpretation. However, more
significant matters of public interest, the release of which
might facilitate the circumvention of agency regulations, may
be withheld under the "high 2" interpretation.'
Considering the withholding of Civil Service Commission
management evaluations, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Vaughn v. Rosen85 articulated its pref-
erence for the Senate Report." The D.C. Circuit read Exemp-
tion 2 to prevent disclosure of "only routine 'house-keeping'
matters in which it can be presumed the public lacks any sub-
stantial interest.""7 Because the management evaluation ma-
terials at issue did not relate to " 'housekeeping' matters such
as parking facilities, lunchrooms, sick leave, and the like," and
because the reports were of 'legitimate public interest," the
court denied the withholding of the materials." In his concur-
rence, Judge Leventhal added an important gloss to assist in
such as employee relations and working conditions and routine adminis-
trative procedures which are withheld under the present law.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 10 (1996).
82 See, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 670 F.2d
1051, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (overruling the rationale of Jordan and ex-
tending Exemption 2 to cover a law enforcement training manual); Jordan v. Unit-
ed States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (refusing
to extend Exemption 2 to apply to documents the disclosure of which might lead
to circumvention of agency regulations); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (limiting Exemption 2 to apply to house-keeping internal matters
of no legitimate public interest). The D.C. Circuit is "at the forefront" of FOIA
jurisprudence. Laurie A. Doherty, Chapter, The Freedom of Information Act: The
Government's Authority to Withhold Previously Disclosed Information Under FOIA,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 880, 881 (1988).
'3 See Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
" See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 96.
523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83 See id. at 1140.
" Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1140. One commentator approved the adoption of the
Senate report because it "seems fully faithful to the words of the statute"; where-
as, the House version reflects the House Committee's attempt "to change the
meaning of the legislative language." KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:30, at 390-91 (2d ed. 1978).
" See Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1143.
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reading the language of Exemption 2. Noting that" 'relating' is
potentially all-encompassing while 'solely' is potentially all-
excluding," he stated that the language should be construed to
cover "predominantly" internal materials. 9 The Supreme
Court soon thereafter approved the Vaughn majority's reading,
but it suggested that, on different facts, an expansion of Ex-
emption 2 might be warranted.
On facts very similar to Vaughn, the Supreme Court
agreed with the Vaughn court's interpretation in Department
of Air Force v. Rose.9" Considering the withholding of Air
Force disciplinary summaries,91 the Court reviewed lower
court decisions and found that a majority of them considered
the Senate Report to reflect congressional intent. 2 The re-
maining decisions followed the House Report and allowed the
withholding of documents where release of information might
result in the circumvention of agency regulations. Because it
believed that the hearing summaries in Rose would not pose a
threat of circumvention of Air Force regulations, the Court
found it unnecessary to rule decisively on the applicability of
the House version.94 The Court then agreed with the Vaughn
court's reasoning,95 but it left open an important question of
whether the House version might, under different circumstanc-
es, be appropriate. The Court stated, "[A]t least where the
situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of
agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to matters
subject to such a genuine and significant public interest."96
" Id. at 1150-51 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
425 U.S. 352.
91 See id. at 354-55.
92 See id. at 363 n.5 (collecting cases).
" See id. at 363-64; see also Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest
Serv., 923 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (D.N.M. 1995). The district court noted:
[A] majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have interpreted the lan-
guage of exemption 2 to encompass two types of information: (1) internal
matters of a relatively trivial or mundane nature, i.e., rules as to
personnel's use of parking facilities, regulations of lunch hours, and state-
ments of sick leave policy, and (2) more substantial internal matters, the
disclosure of which would allow circumvention of a statute or agency
regulation, i.e., rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for govern-
ment investigators.
Maricopa Audubon Soc'y, 923 F. Supp. at 1439 (citations omitted).
4 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 364.
See id. at 365-67.
9' Id. at 369.
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The D.C. Circuit did not immediately expand the scope of
Exemption 2 to embrace the "risk of circumvention" application
that the Rose Court had left open. Although Jordan v. United
States Department of Justice97 presented just such a case (the
requested materials were charging manuals of the U.S.
Attorney's Office),98 the court did not read Rose to permit the
use of Exemption 2 in these circumstances.
Instead, the Jordan court engaged in a structural analysis
of the statutory language." Reading "internal" to modify the
entire phrase "personnel rules and practices of an agency," the
court concluded that the exemption was intended to allow
withholding of those internal rules dealing with "relations
among the employees of an agency" while requiring the disclo-
sure of those that have a "more direct impact" on the pub-
lic.1"' The court stated that "internal personnel" modified
both "rules" and "practices." 1' The Jordan court noted that
the DOJ's disjunctive reading had already been ruled out when
the court vacated the Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal
Energy Administration decision." 2 This reading would bifur-
cate the language to permit withholding of "internal personnel
rules" (i.e., material dealing with the agency's relations with
its employees) and of "practices of an agency" (i.e., material
dealing with the "operational conduct of the employees").'
The court in Jordan stated that such a disjunctive reading of
the statute would be "violative of... English grammar." 4
The Jordan court then concluded that Rose did not imply that
Exemption 2 could be used to withhold documents where" 'dis-
closure may risk circumvention of agency regulation.' 105
' 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en bane).
' See id. at 771.
See id. at 763.
160 Id.
101 Id. at 764.
... See Jordan, 591 F.2d at 763-64 (citing Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Fed.
Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
103 Id. at 763.
1 Id. at 764.
'" Id. at 771 (no citation in original). Judge Leventhal's concurrence criticized
the majority's rejection of the Rose Court's suggestion that Exemption 2 could be
used to withhold materials that could increase the risk of circumvention of agency
regulations. However, Judge Leventhal did not believe that the interest in prevent-
ing circumvention of the law outweighed the public interest in the documents, so
he concurred in the result. See id. at 784 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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This "bare... holding[]" of Jordan, however, was subsequently
overruled by the D.C. Circuit in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms,"6 which explicitly adopted the view
of Exemption 2 that the Supreme Court first suggested in
Rose."7
After Rose, severAl other courts of appeals departed from
the D.C. Circuit's view in Jordan and adopted versions of Ex-
emption 2 that permitted withholding in cases where circum-
vention of agency regulations presented a problem. For exam-
ple, in Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms,' the Second Circuit followed the suggestion of the
Rose Court to allow the withholding of portions of a Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF") training manual
pursuant to Exemption 2.09 Because a training manual was
at issue, the court considered the House Report and deter-
mined that disclosure of the manual would increase the risk of
circumvention of agency regulations."' In support of its con-
clusion that withholding of the materials was proper, the court
stated that disclosure "would increase the risk of physical
harm to those engaged in law enforcement and significantly
assist those engaged in criminal activity by acquainting them
with the intimate details of the strategies employed in its
detection.""' Although the court was also presented with the
question of whether a court might properly exercise its equita-
ble discretion to sustain withholding of the materials, it de-
clined to rule on this question, but not before suggesting that a
court may do so under "exceptional" circumstances."' Consid-
ering the same portions of the BATF manual at issue in
Caplan, the Ninth Circuit, in Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms,"' interpreted Exemption 2 more nar-
rowly, permitting the withholding of "law enforcement materi-
als, disclosure of which may risk circumvention of agency regu-
106 670 F.2d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); see also discussion infra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
17 See 670 F.2d at 1074.
100 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978).
100 See id. at 547-48.
... See id. at 547.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 546. (citation omitted).
113 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
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lation.""4 Its view was adopted shortly thereafter by the D.C.
Circuit in Crooker."5
It did not take long before the D.C. Circuit changed the
course set in Jordan to adopt the view left open by Rose and
applied in Caplan and Hardy. In Crooker, the court revisited
the issue presented in Jordan several years before. 116 Here,
the BATF sought to withhold portions of an agent training
manual."7
Holding that the training manual met the "test of 'predom-
inant internality,' and since its disclosure significantly risks
circumvention of federal statutes or regulations," the Crooker
court sustained the BATF's assertion of Exemption 2.11 First,
noting the inconsistency between Jordan and this opinion, the
Crooker court rejected the rationale applied in Jordan, which
supported the view that risk of circumvention of agency regula-
tions could not sustain the withholding of documents under
Exemption 2."' Since the rationale of Jordan was not essen-
tial to support the holding of that decision, the Crooker court
noted that the outcome of Jordan remained undisturbed.
20
Pitting its own opinion in Jordan against those of the
Ninth and Second Circuits, in Hardy and Caplan, respectively,
the Crooker court reconciled the split by stating that Exemp-
tion 2 covers both "minor employment matters" and other "sig-
nificant matters like job training for law enforcement person-
nel."12' Harmonizing these divergent readings of the statute
and its legislative history, the Crooker court formally an-
nounced the view suggested by the Supreme Court in Rose.22
' Id. at 656.
,1 See Crooker, 670 F.2d 1051.
111 See id. at 1052-53.
1,? See id. at 1053.
,, Id. The holding in Crooker has not been met with uniform approval. See
Carro, supra note 79, at 321 (criticizing the Crooker majority's construction of
Exemption 2). But see KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§ 5:30, at 143, 147 (Supp. 1989) (stating "[t]hat the Crooker theory is fundamen-
tally preferable [to Jordan]" and that "courts should reject Jordan and follow
Crooker . . ").
9 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1053.
.2 See id.; see also id. at 1091 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); DAVIS, supra note
118, at § 5:31, at 145 ("The Jordan case is largely superceded by Crooker but not
overruled.").
.2 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1056.
'22 See id. at 1074.
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Citing Judge Leventhal's concurrence in Vaughn, 1  the
court then reiterated that the language of Exemption 2 could
be read to contradict itself with respect to scope: " '[Plushed to
their logical ends, "relating" is potentially all-encompassing
while "solely" is potentially all-excluding.' , 124 Relying on
Judge Leventhal's construction of the language, the Crooker
court adopted his term "predominantly" to reconcile the differ-
ences between "relating" and "solely."
1 25
Not all cases considering a risk of circumvention present
such obvious risks as those implicit in the release of the BATF
training manual at issue in Caplan, Hardy, and Crooker. For
example, in Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith,26 the
D.C. Circuit considered whether administrative "filing and
routing" notations on an airgram relating to L. Ron Hubbard
could be withheld based on a risk of circumvention. 127 After
reaffirming the Crooker court's extension of Exemption 2,128
the court expressed doubt as to whether the Supreme Court in
Rose intended that one must show that risk of circumvention
will arise after disclosure, but the court presumed that the
agency had shown circumvention because Scientology failed to
contest this aspect of the lower court's finding.
129
If Caplan, Hardy, and Crooker limited Exemption 2 to law
enforcement materials such as BATF training manuals, such
limitation has been eroded by other courts of appeals. This
erosion has extended the scope of Exemption 2 to "situations
where there is neither a statute nor an agency regulation at
risk of circumvention, but disclosure would render the records
operationally useless."3 ° For example, over a strongly-worded
dissent, the Ninth Circuit in Dirksen v. United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services 31 permitted the with-
"'2 523 F.2d at 1150-51 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
124 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1056.
12 See id. at 1057.
126 721 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
127 Id. at 829.
121 See id at 830-31 & n.4.
129 See id at 831.
Allan Robert Adler, Recent Developments in FOIA Law, 11 COMM. LAW. 13
(1993); see also Kaganove v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 884, 889-90 (7th Cir.
1988) (withholding a job candidate evaluation plan); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. United States Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
... 803 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
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holding of "Medicare Policy Guidelines."132 Arguing that pro-
cessing guidelines constitute a form of administrative materi-
als, the court permitted withholding because the release of the
documents would allow care providers to circumvent agency
oversight.133 The dissent pointed out that Hardy limited the
withholding to traditional "law enforcement materials" only
and faulted the majority for extending that rule."'
Another important variation extending the scope of Ex-
emption 2 beyond the context of rules and practices appears in
Schwaner v. Department of Air Force,'35 where an insurance
salesman sought the "names and military duty addresses" of
low-ranking Air Force personnel.'36 Unlike the line of cases
dealing with instructions to law enforcement and unlike the
processing guidelines withheld by Dirksen, Schwaner consid-
ered the withholding of a mere roster of names."3 7 The
Schwaner court recognized that the list was not "a rule or
practice in the most literal sense," and it acknowledged that
prior case law did not squarely address materials that were
neither rules nor practices. 3 ' Rejecting the government's
comparison of the summaries of Honor Committee rulings that
were contested in Rose to the name and address roster sought
here on the basis that they related to the Air Force's practice
of collecting data and that the roster could be withheld under
Exemption 2,"' the court stated that to be related to an
agency rule to the extent that the documents may be withheld,
they must "bear upon, or cast light upon, those practices."' °
Then, deciding that "lists do not necessarily... shed signifi-
cant light on a rule or practice; insignificant light is not
enough," the court refused to endorse the government's posi-
tion. 141
13' Id. at 1458.
133 See id. at 1459.
1 Id. at 1460-61 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
13 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 794.
13 See id.
138 Id. at 795.
,' See id. at 795-96.
... Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 796.
1.1 Id. at 797-98.
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Not until Schiller v. NLRB' did the D.C. Circuit pro-
vide an easy shorthand for the two interpretations of Exemp-
tion 2 that the court had framed in Vaughn and the post-Rose
cases.143 In Schiller, a requester sought "memoranda and in-
structions pertaining to the implementation of the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act," a fee-shifting statute.' Writing for the
panel, Chief Judge Mikva articulated Exemption 2 as follows:
"If the threshold test of predominant internality is met, an
agency may withhold the material 'by proving that either [1]
"disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation," or [2]
"the material relates to trivial administrative matters of no
genuine public interest." ' "45 The Schiller court then named
the two types of Exemption 2 material: "Predominantly inter-
nal documents the disclosure of which would risk circumven-
tion of agency statutes and regulations are protected by the so-
called 'high 2' exemption. Predominantly internal documents
that deal with trivial administrative matters fall under the
'low 2' exemption." "6
Citing Crooker, the court stated that if the material was
"designed to establish rules and practices for agency personnel
and ... involved no ' "secret law" of the agency,' " it could be
withheld. "7 Ruling that the litigation documents at issue
could be withheld under a "high 2" interpretation of Exemption
2, the court acknowledged that the principle articulated in
Crooker is not limited to situations "where penal or enforce-
ment statutes could be circumvented" and may also apply to
situations where " 'disclosure ... would render those docu-
ments operationally useless.' "18
142 964 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
1 See id. at 1207.
144 Id. at 1206.
145 Id. at 1207 (quoting Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 794 (citations omitted)) (numer-
als in Schiller text).
14G Id.
14 Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1207 (quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Rose,
425 U.S. at 369)).
148 Id. at 1208 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Empl. Union v. United States Customs
Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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II. THE MA!ICOPA AUDUBON SOCIETY LITIGATION
The MAS submitted FOLA requests in 1994 to the FS
seeking documents that reveal the specific nesting sites of two
species, one listed as "threatened," the other considered a "can-
didate."49 In response to these requests, the FS asserted the
"high 2" variant of Exemption 2, which exempts from disclo-
sure those documents "relating solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency," where disclosure would also
risk circumvention of agency regulations. 50 Presenting a nov-
el set of facts, 51 the cases were eventually appealed to the
Tenth and Ninth Circuits, both of which held that the materi-
als could not be withheld under Exemption 2.152
A. The Tenth Circuit Ruling: Audubon Society v. United
States Forest Service53( MAS III)
In the litigation brought in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico, MAS sought disclosure of
FS management territory maps"s that identify various nest-
ing sites of the Mexican spotted owl.'55 In part responsible for
the management of fish and wildlife in national parks, the FS
prepared these maps in the execution of its duties imposed by
the ESA.'56 Before the Tenth Circuit, the FS asserted that
"9 MAS 1I, 104 F.3d 1201, 1202 (10th Cir. 1997); Brief of Appellants, supra
note 1, at 5.
,' See MAS 11, 104 F.3d at 1203; MAS 1, 108 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).
For a discussion of "high 2," see supra Part I.B.2.
... One district court framed the facts narrowly, stating, 'There appear to be no
reported decisions in which a federal court has analyzed whether factual material
pertaining to a threatened or endangered species, such as maps, should be with-
held under exemption 2 of the FOTA." Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. United States
Forest Serv., 923 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (D.N.M. 1995).
... See MAS I, 108 F.3d at 1085 (noting the Tenth Circuit's rejection of "iden-
tical arguments"). The Tenth Circuit ruled in January, 1997, see MAS II, 104 F.3d
at 1201, and the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in March, 1997, see MAS 1,
108 F.3d at 1082.
'3 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1997).
,', Management territory maps reveal the area "around a confirmed or inferred
sighting of... Mexican spotted owls." Maricopa Audubon Soc'y, 923 F. Supp. at
1437 n.1. Certain activities, such as, road building, timbering, and drilling are
prohibited within these roughly 2000 acre management territories. See id.
... See MAS 11, 104 F.3d at 1202.
1' See id. at 1203.
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the management territory maps fell within the statutory lan-
guage of Exemption 2, urging the court to adopt a "high 2"157
interpretation applied in some circuits,' 8 because the disclo-
sure of nesting sites would create a risk of circumventing the
ESA. 159
In an effort to nudge the maps into" 'the terms of the stat-
utory language,' 1)160 the FS argued for a construction of
§ 552(b)(2)'s language that implied that the descriptive words,
"internal personnel," modified only "rules" and not "practices of
an agency."161 Under this disjunctive reading, the FS argued
that "internal personnel rules" are distinct from those docu-
ments revealing the "practices of an agency."162 That is, the
documents should be withheld because they relate to an agen-
cy practice by "assist[ing] [FS] personnel in their management
duties.""
Relying on Jordan," the court rejected the disjunctive
reading that the FS gave to the phrase, "related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."165 Rul-
ing that "internal personnel" modifies both "rules" and "practic-
es," the court adopted the narrower construction and stated
that the proper inquiry is whether the maps were sufficiently
related to "personnel" practices, not whether the maps were
related to "agency" practices (as the FS urged).'66 Concluding
its inquiry, the court briefly stated, "It stretches the language
of the exemption too far to conclude that owl maps 'relate' to
personnel practices of the [FS]. "167 The court, citing
Vaughn,'68 noted the risk of holding otherwise:
.. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
1. The MAS I court noted that four circuits have adopted the "high 2" inter-
pretation. See MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1204 n.1.
159 See id. at 1203.
1 Id. at 1204 (quoting Schwaner v. Dep't of Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1990)).
161 Id.
162 Id.
1'6 MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1204.
1' For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Jordan, see infra Part
II.C.
1' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
166 See MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1204.
167 id.
1s 523 F.2d 1136.
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In some attenuated sense, virtually everything that goes on in the
Federal Government, and much that goes on outside of it, could be
said to be "related" through some chain of circumstances to the "in-
ternal personnel rules and practices of an agency." The potentially
all-encompassing sweep of a broad exemption of this type [would]
undercut] the vitality of any such approach.'69
Finding that the maps fail the first prong of the "high 2"
Crooker analysis because they are not sufficiently related to
rules and practices of an agency, the court declined to proceed
any further.7 ' Indeed, MAS II leaves open the question of
whether the Tenth Circuit would adopt the "high 2" interpreta-
tion so vigorously urged by the FS.'
The court also rejected the FS's argument that since the
maps do not constitute "secret law,"172 the agency is not re-
quired to disclose them. Reasoning that although the agency
must disclose the information if it constitutes secret law, the
court stated that the converse is not true. Because the infor-
mation is not secret law does not mean that the agency may
withhold it.173
The court declined much comment on the district court's
order that the parties enter into a confidentiality agreement
regarding the maps because the issue was not raised on ap-
peal. However, the court questioned whether such agreements
are consistent with the purposes of FOIA.74
... See MAS 1I, 104 F.3d at 1204 (citation omitted) (alterations in MAS I!).
170 See id.
"' "We agree with the district court that even if we were to adopt the high 2
analysis . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
... Secret law is "information withheld from the public which defines the legal
standards by which the public's conduct is regulated." Id. at 1204 (citing Hardy v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 631 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1980)).
"" See id. (" '[Elxemption [21 was not designed to authorize withholding of all
matters except . . . secret law .... Rather, the general thrust of the exemption
is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for
public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to
have an interest.' ") (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70
(1976)).
'7 MAS II, 104 F.3d at 1204-05. Because the MAS 11 court found it unneces-
sary to consider the propriety of confidentiality agreements to dispose of the ap-
peal under Exemption 2, an extended discussion of this dicta lies beyond the im-
mediate scope of this Comment, which is concerned primarily with the court's
application of Exemption 2.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Ruling: Maricopa Audubon Society v.
United States Forest Service'75 ( MAS I")
Argued while MAS II was pending in the Tenth Circuit,
the facts of MAS I are almost identical to that litigation.
MAS's request for "nest sites of northern goshawks on [FS]
lands"176 was denied by the FS, which relied on Exemption
2.177
The United States District Court for the District of Arizo-
na ruled against disclosure of the information on alternative
grounds. First, exercising its equitable discretion, the court
denied disclosure, articulating a concern that if MAS were
given the information, the FS would also have to give the in-
formation to those who might harm the goshawk. 171 Alterna-
tively, it ruled that the information indeed "related to the
agency's 'internal policies and procedures' for law enforce-
ment," therefore, falling within the language of Exemption2. 179
The court of appeals rejected the FS's arguments that the
"creation of nest-site location information 'relates to' an agency
'practice' because (1) the creation of such information itself
constitutes a 'practice' and (2) the 'practice' of creating the
information 'also "casts light" ' on other "practices" of the
[FS] . .. .'"' The court of appeals stated its fear that under
this approach, the government would be able to withhold "al-
most all information collected or created by the govern-
ment ... 181
Following the Tenth Circuit's opinion and adopting a nar-
row reading of Exemption 2, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
FS's argument that the materials must relate to "personnel
practices," and not simply "practices of an agency," to be with-
held under Exemption 2.182 Citing the D.C. Circuit's ruling in
125 108 F.3d 1082.
178 Id. at 1084.
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 Id.
18 MAS I, 108 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 24-
25).
1 Id.
182 See id.
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Schwaner,'8 ' the Ninth Circuit analogized the goshawk nest-
ing maps to a roster of names and military duty addresses of
Air Force personnel.1" In both situations, the court suggested
that arguments stating that disclosure would reveal an agency
practice could enable an agency to "withhold practically all of
the information that it ever gathers."185 Therefore, unless the
materials shed "significant light" on an agency practice, they
may not be withheld under Exemption 2."'6
In addition, the Ninth Circuit rejected the FS's argument
that the nesting information should be exempt because it could
be considered "law enforcement materials, the disclosure of
which may risk circumvention of agency regulation.""7 Dis-
tinguishing both Hardy and Dirksen, which held that Exemp-
tion 2 covered, respectively, federal agent training manuals on
searches and raids and Medicare claims-processing guidelines
(which could have been used to avoid audits), the Ninth Circuit
held that since the "information [in the maps] does not tell the
[FS] how to catch lawbreakers; nor does it tell lawbreakers
how to avoid the [FS]'s enforcement efforts," Exemption 2 did
not apply to the nesting information. 8'
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's exercise
of equitable discretion, noting that the litigants both agreed
that the district court ruling on this basis was improper.
8 9
The court then concluded by addressing the issue of whether
the FS could enter into a confidentiality agreement with MAS
in which the FS would be bound not to disclose the information
1 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
l MAS I, 108 F.3d at 1086.
I Id.
18 Id.
Id. (citing Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 631 F.2d 653,
656 (9th Cir. 1980)); Dirksen v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
803 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986).
'" Id. at 1087.
... The AAS I court stated:
The notion that a district court may exempt materials that do not fall
within one of FOIA's nine enumerated exemptions runs contrary not only
to the fact that the exemptions are "explicitly exclusive," . . . , but also
to the unmistakable intent of Congress: "Congress sought to insulate its
product from judicial tampering and to preserve the emphasis on disclo-
sure by admonishing that the 'availability of records to the public' is not
limited, except as specifically stated."
MAS 1, 108 F.3d at 1087 (citations omitted).
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to a third party.9 ' Agreeing with the district court's decision,
the Ninth Circuit stated, "FOIA does not permit selective dis-
closure of information only to certain parties, and that once the
information is disclosed to [MAS], it must be made available to
all members of the public who request it." 9'
C. Discussion
Put simply, the facts of MAS II and MAS I present a "puz-
zling situation" "' as far as FOIA case law is concerned, one
that reveals the limitations of the current analytical frame-
work of Exemption 2 and suggests that it is ill-suited to re-
solve future cases in which the FOIA requester is not an envi-
ronmental advocacy and research group but a landowner or
poacher who does not have the best interests of endangered
species in mind.
Because of the significant public interest in the documents
at issue in the MAS litigation, the only variant of Exemption 2
available to the FS was the "high 2" variant. In fact, the dis-
trict court in MAS 11 acknowledged this limitation,93 and the
FS did not assert the "low 2" exemption in either litigation.194
Accordingly, the discussion presented below focuses on the
courts' application of the "high 2" variant.
1. The First Prong: Whether the Maps Fall Within the
Statutory Language
As one commentator has noted, the FS's contention that
the maps satisfied the first prong of the "high 2" variant was
"' See id. at 1088. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit rejected the view, extensively
briefed by MAS, that elimination of the risk of circumvention through the use of a
confidentiality agreement would take the case out of Exemption 2 entirely. See
Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 18-20.
191 Id. Because the parties to the MAS I case agreed that the lower court's
exercise of equitable discretion was improper, see MAS I, 108 F.3d at 1087, a
more detailed discussion of the court's dicta lies beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. However, it is important to note that, having been reminded" by the parties
that the court left this issue open in Hardy, see Hardy, 631 F.2d at 655 n.1, the
court took this opportunity (albeit in dicta) to speak disfavorably about the exer-
cise of equity powers in the FOIA context.
19'2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at § 5.3, at 126.
19 See Maricopa Audubon Soc'y, 923 F. Supp. at 1439.
194 See generally MAS II, 104 F.3d 1201; MAS I, 108 F.3d 1082.
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"weak."19 Under most interpretations of Exemption 2, maps
such as those at issue in the MAS litigation could probably not
be considered "related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency."9 ' As argued by MAS before the
Ninth Circuit, the documents do not "bear an adequate rela-
tion," nor are they "predominantly internal"; therefore, they do
not satisfy the first prong of the analysis."9 7 The FS, on the
other hand, chose to argue that the maps do indeed fall within
the statutory language, insofar as the language does not limit
application of the exemption to "strictly 'personnel' mat-
ters.""'98 Noting that the FS had argued nothing more than
that it "uses [the maps] to carry out its duties,"'99 MAS coun-
ter-argued that the relationship between the maps and those
duties was too attenuated to satisfy the first prong and indeed
that the alternative would render the exemption "all-encom-
passing.)
200
Considering the FS's argument first, while compelling, its
disjunctive reading of Exemption 2 (even if it had been suc-
cessful before either court) would probably not have been suffi-
cient to sustain withholding because the FS would not have
been able to draw an adequate relation between the maps and
either personnel rules or practices of an agency.
Before both courts of appeals, the FS attempted to with-
hold management territory maps under its disjunctive reading
of the statutory language to avoid having to argue that there
was an adequate relationship between the maps and a person-
nel rule. The FS's disjunctive reading of the phrase into "inter-
nal pdrsonnel rules" on the one hand, and "practices of an
agency" on the other, is not entirely unsupported by precedent.
The FS's argument for reading the statutory language
disjunctively is analogous to a reading offered in the vacated
panel opinion of the D.C. Circuit, Ginsburg, Feldman &
Bress."'0 Jordan, the case rejecting this reading as "viola-
,g DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, § 5.3, at 126.
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
19 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 11.
... Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 17 & 23-24.
... Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 11.
20 Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 11 (citation omitted).
201 591 F.2d 717.
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tive... of English grammar," °2 has itself been called into
question."3 Yet even under a disjunctive reading of the lan-
guage, the FS might have struggled to show an adequate rela-
tion to the agency practice, let alone the personnel rules.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis of the adequacy of the rela-
tionship between the maps and an internal personnel practice
appears conclusory, °4 but even under a lenient interpretation
of other decisional law, the result would probably have been
the same. As the Ninth Circuit did in MAS 1, a powerful analo-
gy a court might draw to support disclosure lies between the
maps sought here and the roster of names and service address-
es contested in Schwaner. As the Schwaner court stated, docu-
ments requested do not need to be related to "a rule or practice
in the most literal sense."2"5 Therefore, given an adequate re-
lationship between the materials sought and the personnel
practice, an agency could still justify the withholding of man-
agement territory maps. That is, simply because a map does
not clearly articulate a rule or reveal a practice does not mean
that it could not be withheld. But, where the document, such
as the list in Schwaner, fails to "shed significant light" on such
a practice, withholding may not be justified.0 ' Here, the
maps fail to shed any light on an agency practice other than,
as the Tenth Circuit noted, the practice of making such
maps.20 7 While the maps are evidence of the FS's practice of
monitoring species populations, because they only identify
nesting sites, they offer no more insight into the FS's practice
or strategy than one might be able to glean from the ESA or
the applicable regulations themselves.
Furthermore, the maps themselves, unlike the manuals at
issue in Caplan, Hardy, and Dirksen, reveal not procedures for
investigating violations or evaluating medicare claims, but the
22 Jordan, 591 F.2d at 764.
2"3 See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051,
1053, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
204 In this part of the decision, the court does not draw any analogies between
the facts at hand and any other decision dealing with similar materials. In fact,
the only precedent the court cites in this section is Vaughn, and it does so only to
express a fear over interpreting the exemption too broadly. See MAS II, 104 F.3d
1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
" Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 795.
216 Id. at 797-98.
" See MAS I, 108 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
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mere location of nesting sites. The essence of the parties' dis-
pute over the maps' relatedness to internal rules and practices
turns on the threshold of reasonableness to be applied to the
Exemption 2 language. As raised by Judge Leventhal's concur-
rence in Vaughn, one must temper the language to avoid the
situation in which the statute would become a bar to all disclo-
sure based on merely superficial relationships."' The tension,
therefore, exists between competing views of whether maps are
more like lists requested in Schwaner or more like law enforce-
ment training manuals. If the maps shed significant light on
the internal personnel rules or agency practices, the FS would
be closer to passing this threshold. However, to the extent that
the FS merely asserted that they were "assist[ed"2 9 by the
maps and did not contend that the maps revealed any particu-
lar method or process, the court's ruling was correct.
Common definitions of the term "map" support this view.
While the noun is generally understood as "[a] representation,
usually on a plane surface, or a region of the earth or heav-
ens," 21 the verb form reminds one of a different, but very
common kind of map. In one sense, the verb form means "to
plan or delineate, especially in detail; arrange."21' Where
these two parts of speech converge is in the sort of map (such
as a diagram of dance steps) that does both. Much as a sche-
matic diagram details the location of various objects and ac-
tors, maps may also represent the "plan" or process by which
the actor is to accomplish his goal. Had the facts allowed, or
had the FS considered, arguments that the maps represent the
processes followed by FS personnel, not merely a set of nest
locations, the FS would have been that much further towards
convincing the court that release of such maps would damage
the FS's efforts. Only then would the maps bear enough of an
adequate relationship to defeat MAS's claim.
To avoid the self-contradictory nature of the statutory
language, Judge Leventhal, in Vaughn, articulated the "pre-
dominantly internal" test."2 As clarified by the D.C. Circuit
"' See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
2- MAS II, 104 F.2d at 1204.
210 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1096 (3d
ed. 1992).
21" Id. at 1097.
212 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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in Cox v. United States Department of Justice,213 to be consid-
ered internal, the documents may "not purport to regulate" the
public, nor may they set standards for "agency personnel in
deciding whether to proceed against" the public.214 The FS's
argument in this regard is that the maps contain no regula-
tions or "secret law"; therefore, they need not be disclosed." 5
When argued before the Tenth Circuit, this same argument
failed because a mere preference for disclosing secret law can-
not be converted into a basis for non-disclosure where no secret
law is at issue, especially where, as here, the public has an
interest in the documents216 and considering that the purpose
of FOIA is to effectuate broad disclosure of agency records."'
2. The Second Prong: The Risk of Circumvention of ESA
Regulations
Neither court of appeals in the MAS litigation reviewed
whether the FS had sustained its burden of proving that dis-
closure of the documents would risk circumvention of agency
regulations.2 8 Had the FS convinced both courts to proceed
to the second prong of Exemption 2's analysis, several deci-
sions, dealing with arguments of increased harm to species in
the context of critical habitat designation, suggest that the FS
might have lost by failing to satisfy prong two. However, these
decisions are not directly controlling on this issue. The argu-
ments presented before the Ninth Circuit reveal an interesting
problem concerning the scope of the Rose Court's "circumven-
tion" language,"9 but the FS's arguments with respect to the
second prong would not necessarily have been fatal to its
claim.
213 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
214 Id. at 5 & n.2.
215 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 29-32.
216 See MAS II, 104 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Dep't of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976)).
217 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
218 See id.; MAS I, 108 F.3d 1082, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1997). The MAS I court
did, however, consider the narrower law enforcement manual version of the exemp-
tion. See MAS 1, 108 F.3d at 1086-87.
21 Rose, 425 U.S. at 369.
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Whether the release of management territory maps might
risk circumvention of agency regulations is a question that
raises concerns about the scope of the language "circumvention
of agency regulations."22 Borrowing language typically used
in FOIA law enforcement manual cases, MAS argued for a nar-
row interpretation of the circumvention language, arguing that
circumvention of agency regulation would only be met where a
violator would be instructed on how to " 'avoid detection' " or
"get away with" breaking the law.22'
On the other hand, the FS interpreted this language
broadly by citing cases dealing with Medicare guidelines and
candidate hiring plans, equating "serious risk of harm to the
goshawk" with circumvention of statutes and regulations
passed for the purpose of protecting the species. 2 While the
former approach would permit release of information up to the
point that it would enable one to elude law enforcement detec-
tion, the latter would entertain arguments that disclosure
would frustrate or diminish the FS's objectives generally, not
merely with respect to catching violators.
Perhaps unable to find case law supporting its position
that "circumvention of law" should always be narrowly con-
strued, MAS attempted to turn this lack of precedent to its
favor. Finding that the only cases supporting non-disclosure
dealt with the types of "manual[s] for personnel on how to
screen or detect violators of law, "22' MAS reasoned that be-
cause the maps give no instructions, but merely point out
where the species are, withholding should not be
permitted.224 MAS concluded, "Release to the public would
2. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 17-21; Brief for Appellees, supra
note 61, at 33-44; Reply Brief of Appellants at 10-14, Audubon Soc'y v. United
States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-16919) (on file with
Brooklyn Law Review).
221 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Hardy v. Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 631 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1980)); Dirksen v. United
States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 803 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 545 (2d
Cir. 1978)).
" See Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 35-37 (citing Kaganove v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 884, 889 (1988) (candidate evaluation plans); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same);
Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1459 (Medicare processing guidelines)).
2" Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 15.
2.4 Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 15.
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not risk circumvention of law, any more than the general
knowledge of the locations of banks increases the risk that
they will be robbed."225
While it appears that most cases sustaining an agency's
withholding tend to deal with law enforcement instructions,
this does not mean that current readings of "circumvention of
agency regulation" should not be expanded to include the FS's
broader frustration-of-objectives interpretation. In fact, this
broader view has also been endorsed by the Attorney General,
who articulated a policy of asserting the exemption "where the
agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to
an interest protected by that exemption."226
Nor does MAS's analogy to disclosing the location of banks
sustain MAS's narrow construction. While one could argue that
species' nests are protected by the height of a tree and criminal
prosecution under the ESA, just as banks are protected by
fortifications and the threat of criminal prosecution, the analo-
gy misses the mark in a more fundamental manner. After all,
it is the mere presence of species at a particular location that
sparks the kind of animosity that threatens the species' contin-
ued existence.2 7 The presence of a bank on a particular cor-
ner does not typically aggravate individuals to the extent that
the presence of a protected species on a tract of their land
might.
In support of its allegation that the maps' disclosure would
increase risk to the goshawk, the FS cited its "awareness" and
general evidence of the risk to the particular species at is-
sue-goshawk behavior makes the bird easy to identify in the
wild, other FOIA requests, and related lawsuits-revealing that
they are a politically sensitive species particularly vulnerable
to attack.2 Stating that the documents' release would " 'fa-
cilitate conduct that ... statute or regulation proscribes,' " the
FS articulated its broad interpretation of the circumvention
language.229 Additionally, the FS stated that withholding was
" Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 17.
2. Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies re-
garding the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993), cited in FOIA GUIDE, su-
pra note 14, at 104.
22 See supra Part I.A.2.
2 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 34.
' Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 35 (quoting Nat'I Treasury Employees
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warranted where the maps' disclosure would render the docu-
ments "'operationally useless.' 230
The difference between the two positions, as argued in the
MAS I litigation, is essentially this: while the release of the
documents (in the FS's opinion) would make it easier for some-
one to "take" a protected species, the documents themselves (as
MAS argued) would not hinder the criminal prosecution that
might follow such a "taking." FOIA case law apparently sup-
ports both views. The line of cases from Caplan to Crooker,
permitting the withholding of portions of BATF manuals, gen-
erally supports MAS's view because each case deals with catch-
ing law-breakers. Yet cases such as Dirksen and NTEU (both
of which permit withholding based on frustration of an
agency's statutory duties) appear to support the more expan-
sive view adopted by the FS.
As suggested above, the distinction between learning how
to commit a crime more easily and learning how to avoid detec-
tion once the crime has been committed is perhaps a distinc-
tion without a difference. Moreover, the difference is less
meaningful in the MAS scenario because the FS's claims may
be viewed as too speculative. Two recent cases reflect a trend
that if either court of appeals had ruled in the FS's favor with
respect to the first prong of Exemption 2, the FS might have
lost its case based on the speculative nature of the perceived
risk of harm to the species. These cases also suggest that
courts might ultimately begin to adopt the FS's broader inter-
pretation of "circumvention of agency regulation."
In the same year that MAS I was decided, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled against the Fish and Wildlife Service (the "FWS") on
a similar "circumvention" claim in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. United States Department of Interior.231 In re-
sponse to the Natural Resources Defense Council's (the
"NRDC") claim that the FWS improperly refused to designate a
threatened songbird's critical habitat, the FWS asserted an
exception to designating critical habitat based on its opinion
that publication of the designation would subject the species to
Union v. United States Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
" Brief for Appellees, supra note 61, at 35 (citing Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Natl Treasury Employees Union, 802 F.2d at
530-31)).
23' 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
increased retaliation and vandalism. 2 Although the FWS
cited eleven such incidents, the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument as too speculative."'
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in viewing as speculative
the FWS's claims that retaliation and vandalism may result
from disclosing species' habitats. In Conservation Council for
Hawaii v. Babbitt," the District of Hawaii followed the
NRDC court's lead, rejecting analogous arguments by the FWS
on behalf of listed plants, although the FWS's arguments be-
fore the court were substantially weakened by a lack of evi-
dence." 5
While NRDC and Conservation Council ruled on this issue
in the context of evaluating failure to designate critical habi-
tat, not the more specific risks that may arise from disclosure
of management territory maps, they remain instructive as to
the courts' likely views of the FS's claims. However, because
the maps at issue in the MAS litigation are much more specific
than those involved in the designation of critical habitat, it is
more likely that a court would find an adequate risk of circum-
vention in the MAS scenario. Yet even where the FWS alleged
eleven incidents of retaliation and vandalism, the Ninth Cir-
cuit still took a hard stand against this evidence, revealing a
tendency to view such claims with skepticism. In the future,
should the FS present specific evidence revealing an increased
risk because of the very precise nature of the species' location
information, courts may not necessarily dismiss these argu-
ments as entirely speculative.
Both MAS II and MAS I were correctly decided because
the alternate result would have yielded an extension of Exemp-
tion 2 law that would run the risk that the scope of the exemp-
tion would become dangerously "all-encompassing."236 These
cases, therefore, reveal a significant limitation of the law of the
See id. at 1123.
' See id. at 1125.
"' 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Haw. 1998).
23' See id. at 1284-85.
" Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J. con-
curring).
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"high 2" variant of Exemption 2 (in that it does not contem-
plate those cases in which the first prong is not satisfied, but
the second prong is satisfied). Perhaps for this reason, Con-
gress recently considered creating a new exemption to address
the result of MAS II and MAS I.
III. ANALYSIS: CONSIDERING THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO
MAS II AND MAS I
The MAS decisions appear correctly decided pursuant to
current formulations of FOIA's Exemption 2. The peculiar
result of the decisions is, however, that information about the
specific location of endangered species is available to anyone
who requests it, regardless of their intentions. Soon after the
decisions were handed down, a bill was introduced in the Sen-
ate to reauthorize and substantially amend the ESA. Entitled
"The Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997" (the
"ESRA")," 7 the bill contained a FOIA Exemption 3 "statutory
exemption"23 ("ESRA FOIA Exemption" or "proposed exemp-
tion") to override this precedent. 9 The proposed language
gave agencies an additional basis to justify the withholding of
such information-where the release of the information might
bring greater harm to protected species-from all FOIA request-
ers, except those who are landowners of the species' habitat.
Reporting the bill out of committee, the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works stated that the addition of a
FOIA Exemption 3 statutory exemption seeks specifically to
address the MAS decisions." ° As authorized by § 552(b)(3),
' The amended version of Senate Bill 1180 was reported out of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works and contains the proposed exemp-
tion analyzed in this Comment. See S. REP. No. 105-128 (1997), available at 1997
WL 688536.
' FOIA Exemption 3 permits statutory exemptions that are incorporated into
FOIA by inserting non-disclosure language into other statutes such as the ESA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 652(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 2000); see also FOIA GUIDE, supra note
14, at 120.
' See infra note 239.
240 Senate Report 105-128 provides:
Section 2(d) of the bill addresses two recent court decisions that prevent-
ed the U.S. Forest Service from withholding information on the location
of nesting sites for two threatened species of birds. The Forest Service
sought to withhold the information pursuant to exemption 2 of the Free-
dom of Information Act (the "FOIAW), on the basis that disclosure would
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Congress may create such an exemption within a particular
statute without amending FOIA itself because FOIA "incorpo-
rates disclosure provisions of other statutes"; 241 the Commit-
tee report states the intention to do so here.242 The ESRA
FOIA Exemption provision read:
(2) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT EXEMPTION.-The Secre-
tary, and the head of any other Federal agency on the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary, may withhold or limit the availability of data
requested to be released pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, if the data describe or identify the location of an endan-
gered species, a threatened species, or a species that has been pro-
posed to be listed as threatened or endangered, and release of the
data would be likely to result in an increased taking of the species,
except that data shall not be withheld pursuant to this paragraph in
response to a request regarding the presence of those species on pri-
vate land by the owner of that land.243
While this specific language has not yet been enacted, other
new legislation aimed at reauthorizing the ESA contains simi-
lar provisions.2" The following Section reflects on several
problems with the language and evaluates the possible effects
of enacting a similar exemption.
facilitate the unlawful taking of the species, but both the 9th Circuit, in
Maricopa Audubon Society v. Thomas, and the 10th Circuit, in Audubon
Society v. U.S. Forest Service, required release of the information. The
bill allows for certain information to be withheld, provided that the infor-
mation describes or identifies the location of a listed species or one pro-
posed to be listed, and the release of the information would likely result
in increased take of the species. Exemption 3 of FOIA (5 USC 552(b)(3))
incorporates disclosure provisions of other statutes, and this provision is
to be considered under that exemption. The provision is also to be nar-
rowly construed, such that increased take of a species must be likely,
rather than merely possible. Furthermore, the exemption may not be
used to withhold information regarding the presence of a species on pri-
vate land from the owner of that land.
S. REP. No. 105-128 (1997), available at 1997 WL 688536.
241 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 120.
242 See supra note 239.
241 S. REP. No. 105-128 (1997), available at 1997 WL 688536 (emphasis added).
In addition to other minor changes, the second version of the bill deleted the itali-
cized text. See S. 1180, Version 2, 105th Cong. (Nov. 4, 1997).
244 See H.R. 3160, 106th Cong. (1999).
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A. Omission of Candidate Species' Information
The Senate Report states that the ESRA FOIA Exemption
is intended to provide a basis for a FOIA exemption denied by
the MAS decisions; however, the bill's language fails to address
one of the species involved in those cases.245 While the Mexi-
can spotted owl was listed as "threatened" at the time of suit
and would be covered by the proposed exemption, the northern
goshawk was merely a "candidate" and had not yet been pro-
posed.24 Failure to include candidate species in the proposed
exemption would cause specific nesting location information to
remain available before formal proposal or listing of the spe-
cies.247 That is, information that could be used to harm the
species would be available to the public while the species is
under consideration by the Secretary as a candidate, but not
once it had been proposed. Theoretically, FOIA requesters
would still be able to obtain specific location information about
species prior to formal listing; thus, providing them with data
useful to poachers and vandals.
B. Different Approaches to Different Risks
The proposed legislation raises another issue regarding
how one might approach the different risks to endangered
species and their habitats that arise from the disclosure of
information about them. There appears to be an inconsistency
among agencies responsible for enforcing the ESA as to wheth-
er the increased risk of harm to species as a result of vandal-
ism or retaliation is serious. While the FS in the MAS litiga-
tion asserted that the species at issue would be more threat-
ened by retaliation and vandalism, the FWS (in the context of
critical habitat designation for plants) has "downplayed the
danger, stating that while vandalism does happen, 'most plant
species are more seriously threatened by conversion of habitat
or incompatible land management regimes than by collecting
or vandalism.' "24I This inconsistency is perhaps largely the
24. See supra note 239.
.. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
247 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
.. McDonald, supra note 43 at 683-84.
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result of the differences between the types of information avail-
able in a critical habitat designation and a management terri-
tory map such as that requested in the MAS litigation.
While a federal agency may assert a "not prudent" defense
to claims of failing to designate critical habitat,249 the MAS
decisions removed a basis for an agency to withhold informa-
tion from a FOIA requester based on the risk of harm to indi-
vidual species during the listing process and thereafter. Yet a
growing line of cases and approving scholarship is eroding
agencies' ability to delay the designation of critical habitat
based on the fears of increased vandalism."' This may war-
rant giving agencies a second chance to withhold more specific
information should concrete evidence of vandalism and retalia-
tion surface. After all, while a critical habitat map may lead
one to a species' preferred range (and may be a "treasure
map"), 1 it will not identify specific nesting sites (certainly
not with the accuracy of the management territory maps con-
tested in the MAS litigation). The proposed exemption might
retain its vitality in this situation. Because of the increased
detail in the management territory maps,5 2 the degree of
specificity should weigh in favor of non-disclosure when evalu-
ating risk and should sustain non-disclosure more frequently
than in the context of designating critical habitat.
C. The Landowner Loophole
The landowner exception as included in the version of S.
1180 published with the Senate Report would facilitate illegal
takings and habitat modification that are already occurring.
This language, deleted from the text in version two of S.
1180,253 should probably not be considered in future bills
without implementing a mechanism for reducing the risk of
... See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 63.
252 A FS "biological evaluation noted that more precise information, such as a
management territory map, could reveal locations of nest stands which might in-
crease the likelihood of malfeasance." Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. United States
Forest Serv., 923 F. Supp. 1436, 1438 (D.N.M. 1995) (noting that management
territory maps are arranged such that the location of a nesting site appears in the
middle of the map).
2" See S. 1180, Version 2, 105th Cong. (Nov. 4, 1997).
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habitat destruction during the process of listing a species. 4
Under current law, a landowner is free to develop habitat
with impunity if a species located thereon has not been list-
ed. 5 The last clause of the ESRA FOIA Exemption preserves
for landowners the opportunity to use FOIA to obtain nesting
maps for the private lands they own whether the species has
been proposed or listed." Submission of a FOIA request un-
der the proposed law by a private landowner would proceed to
complete disclosure, even if (1) the documents requested reveal
the location of a species and (2) release of the documents would
lead to an increased likelihood of "takings." 7 Therefore, as
far as proposed species are concerned, a landowner under the
language proposed in the first version of S. 1180 could contin-
ue to destroy species and habitat of proposed species.
This clause could eviscerate the utility of the exemption in
many cases by permitting disclosure of even an endangered
species' location. After all, landowners have an economic incen-
tive (greater in most instances than that of poachers, hunters,
and others) in escaping ESA regulation because the Act can
reduce or destroy most commercial uses of their land. 8 On
the other hand, as long as enforcement of non-commercial
violations of the ESA remain a "high priority" for the FWS,259
one could make the argument that a landowner in possession
of the information is adequately deterred from harming listed
species by the criminal and civil sanctions provided for in the
ESA,26" although yet unlisted species and their habitats
would remain vulnerable.
.. For a discussion of one possible mechanism, see Martha F. Phelps, Candi-
date Conservation Agreements Under the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and
Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25 ENVT'L AFF. 175 (1997) (describing and
criticizing the use of conservation agreements to avoid listing species).
"' "Because it is perfectly legal to modify the habitat of unlisted species, this
notification can induce landowners to remove candidate species from their property
or to adversely modify their habitat before listing is final." Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Protecting Endangered Species Without Regulating Private Landowners: The Case of
Endangered Plants, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 6 (1998).
See S. REP. NO. 105-128, available at 1997 WL 688536.
' See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
' See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Memorandum: Prioritization of
Law Enforcement Activities, Aug. 4, 1992.
"'2 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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D. Achieving a Balance Through Selective Disclosure
The ESRA FOIA Exemption calls for agencies to set stan-
dards for determining whether the release of the documents
"would be likely to result in an increased taking of spe-
cies."261 The Senate Report provides more guidance, stating,
"The provision is also to be narrowly construed, such that
increased take of a species must be likely, rather than merely
possible."262 Because the ESRA FOIA Exemption was drafted
in response to the MAS cases, which reaffirm the principle
that FOIA disclosures are to be made without consideration of
the identity of the requester,263 one could read the language
in the proposed exemption to either (1) call for the consider-
ation of the requester's identity in the limited circumstances
presented in the MAS litigation or (2) require the Secretary to
find that release of the information generally might increase
the risk of retaliation.
In either case a new exemption should carefully balance
the benefit to environmental advocacy and research groups like
MAS from use of information against those benefits of land-
owners and property rights advocates in order to avoid becom-
ing a sweeping basis for non-disclosure. The maps such as
those at issue in the MAS litigation are important components
of MAS' review of the effectiveness of an agency's enforcement
of the ESA and the results of an agency's actions on endan-
gered species populations.2 ' Such activities are warranted, if
not protected, by the policy of broad disclosure embodied in
FOIA to "hold the governors accountable to the governed."265
Enactment of any such exemption should be carefully formu-
lated to preserve the opportunity for such groups (including
property rights groups) to do so, for without the review of in-
terested organizations, the development of new regulations
would not be guided by their input.266 That is, any system
that creates differential access to information should be very
261 S. REP. NO. 105-128, available at 1997 WL 688536.
262 Id.
26 "Any person . . . , for whatever reason, good or ill, may file a request for an
agency record . . . ." Wald, supra note 14, at 655.
264 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 25.
26 See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3.
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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narrowly constructed to maintain as near a level playing field
as possible.
CONCLUSION
The Maricopa Audubon Society litigation presented an
unusual set of facts to the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, in a dis-
pute which (while not remedied by current Exemption 2 law)
could be remedied with legislative action. As presented in the
Maricopa Audubon Society cases, although there exists a risk
that the information requested could be used to circumvent the
FS's regulation of an endangered species' habitat, the maps at
issue will not fall within the coverage of Exemption 2's lan-
guage. If Congress finds such an exemption is warranted, this
Comment suggests that a careful balance between the interests
of environmental groups and landowners must be struck to
minimize the likelihood of harm to species and their habitat
throughout the listing process, while preserving the rule-mak-
ing processes that will achieve more equitable ends.
Keith T. Tashima

